Corso di laurea magistrale in Filosofia

Formal Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

Formal Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

Anno accademico 2017/2018

Sommario insegnamento

• Obiettivi formativi
• Risultati dell'apprendimento attesi
• Modalità di insegnamento
• Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento
• Programma
• Testi consigliati e bibliografia
• Strumenti didattici

Obiettivi formativi

The course includes two parts.

(i) In the first part, we will address central and general issues in the philosophy of science, including rationality, progress, and scientific realism. Can science be characterized as a distinctively rational endeavour? What kind of progress, if any, occurs across theory-change throughout the history of science? Do our most successful theories allow for truthful knowledge of non-observable entities (such as, say, electrons) or should they be taken solely as effective computational devices for future observations? Classical examples and case-studies from the history and practice of scientific inquiry will be employed to discuss the relevant problems and theoretical positions. The Copernican revolution, in particular, will be a recurrent source of illustrations.

(ii) The second part of the course will address the probabilistic (Bayesian) account of rational inquiry. The key epistemological notion of hypothesis confirmation will be investigated specifically. What does it mean that a hypothesis (e.g., a scientific theory, or a medical diagnosis) is confirmed by some evidence (e.g., an experimental measurement, or a clinical symptom)? Is it possible to provide a general philosophical account of the concept of empirical confirmation? What is the role of logic, probability, and human cognition in understanding this concept? How is a probabilistic analysis of confirmation useful in dispelling classical paradoxes and theoretical puzzles in this area?

The issues and skills involved in the course are central to philosophical education and can also provide philosophical, historical, and methodological insight for students of specific scientific disciplines (like mathematics, physics, psychology, or history).

Risultati dell'apprendimento attesi

Students who successfully complete the course will learn to recognize the patterns of reasoning and argumentation that are central to the analysis of scientific inquiry and critically discuss their features with reference to fundamental logical principles. They will come to master some key problems of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science, the main relevant theoretical options along with their strengths and limitations. They will also know basic elements of probability theory and how they can be employed in the analysis of reasoning and rational inquiry. More generally, the skills acquired in the course will include appropriate application of major logical and epistemological notions and tools to texts and arguments of various kinds, thus fostering critical thinking and effective communication abilities. Finally, students will be able to make considerate assessments concerning the role and impact of science in contemporary society and culture.

Modalità di insegnamento

Lectures and discussion sections, 72 hours overall (12 cfu).

Modalità di verifica dell'apprendimento

The assessment of learning achiements will be made by an oral exam (about 15-20 minutes) and a written essay (about 4000 words). To meet the requirements, students will be expected to identify and discuss the central issues of the course on the basis of the notions and skills acquired, including clarity in presentation, informed use of the terminology, and mastery of appropriate reasoning techniques.

Programma

LIST OF TOPICS

Science, knowledge, and truth

Science and pseudoscience

Theory, evidence, and induction

Hypothetico-deductive accounts of confirmation

Paradoxes of confirmation

Problems of underdetermination

The logic of experimental inquiry

Theory-change, rationality, and scientific progress

Arguments for and against scientific realism

Elements of probability theory

Rational degrees of belief

Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach

P. Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003 (chapters 1-7, 12, and 14).

T.S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 1985.

D. Bradley, A Critical Introduction to Formal Epistemology, Bloomsbury, London, 2015 (chapters 1-3, 8, and 11).

FURTHER READINGS

Topic (i): SCIENCE and PSEUDOSCIENCE

K. Popper, "Science: Conjectures and refutations" (1963), in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 3-10.

T.S. Kuhn, "Logic of discovery or psychology of research?" (1970), in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 11-19.

L. Laudan, "The demise of the demarcation problem", in R.S. Cohen and L. Laudan (eds.), Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983, pp. 111-127.

J. Ladyman, "Toward a demarcation os science from pseudoscience", in M. Pigliucci and M. Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013, pp. 45-59.

Topic (ii): EVIDENCE and UNDERDETERMINATION

P. Duhem, "Physical theory and experiment" (1906), in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 247-279.

L. Laudan, "Demystifying underdetermination" (1990), in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 320-346.

J. Worrall, "Normal science and dogmatism, paradigms, and progress: Kuhn 'versus' Popper and Lakatos", in T. Nickles (ed.), Thomas Kuhn, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003, pp. 65-100.

Topic (iii): OBSERVATION and EXPERIENCE

N.R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, 1958, chapter 1: pp. 4-30.

J. Fodor, "Observation reconsidered", Philosophy of Science, 51 (1984): pp. 23-43.

E. Zahar, "The problem of the empirical basis", in A. O'Hear (ed.), Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems, Cambridge University Press, 1995: pp. 45-74.

Topic (iv): THEORY-CHANGE and PROGRESS

T.S. Kuhn, "Objectivity, value judgment, and theory choice" (1977), in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 102-118.

I. Lakatos, "Science and pseudoscience" (1977), in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 20-26.

I. Lakatos and E. Zahar, "Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's" (1976), in I. Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Philosophical Papers I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 168-192.

J. Worrall, "Scientific discovery and theory-confirmation", in J.C. Pitt (ed.), Change and Progress in Modern Science, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1985, pp. 301-331.

Topic (v): BAYESIAN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

M. Curd and J.A. Cover, "Bayes for beginners", in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 627-638.

W.C. Salmon, "Bayes's theorem and the history of science" (1970), in Y. Balashov and A. Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, London, 2002, pp. 385-402.

W.C. Salmon, "Rationality and objectivity in science, or Tom Kuhn meets Tom Bayes" (1990), in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 551-583.

C. Glymour, "Why I am not a Bayesian" (1980), in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.), Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, Norton & Co., New York, 1998, pp. 584-606.

Topic (vi): FOR and AGAINST SCIENTIFIC REALISM

K. Popper, "Three views concerning human knowledge", in K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge and Kegan, London, 1963, pp. 97-119.

J. Worrall, "Scientific realism and scientific change", Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), pp. 201-231.

G. Gutting, "Realism versus constructive empiricism: A dialogue" (1982), in Y. Balashov and A. Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, London, 2002, pp. 234-247.

J. Worrall, "Structural realism: The best of both worlds?", Dialectica, 43, 1/2 (1989), pp. 99-124.

Orario lezioni

• Materiale didattico
• Bacheca appelli
• Vai a Moodle
• Visita i forum